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This paper presents a reappraisal of unemployment movements in the European Union. Our 
analysis is based on the chain reaction theory of unemployment, which focuses on (a) the 
interaction among labor market adjustment processes, (b) the interplay between these 
adjustment processes and the dynamic structure of labor market shocks, and (c) the interaction 
between the adjustment processes and economic growth. We divide the shocks into 
institutional variables, price variables, and growth drivers. Estimating a system of labor 
market equations for a panel of EU countries, we derive the dynamic unemployment 
responses to each shock. Our analysis permits us to distinguish between the short- and long-
run effects of the shocks. Different shocks generate different degrees of “unemployment 
persistence” (responses to temporary shocks) and “unemployment responsiveness” (responses 
to permanent shocks). We find that the growth drivers play a dominant role in accounting for 
the main swings in EU unemployment. 
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The two standard approaches to interpretting movements of unemployment in the European
Union are the “structural” and “hysteresis” approaches. The structural approach involves
dividing unemployment into cyclical components (depicting business cycle variations, lasting
a few years) and structural components (depicting longer-term movements), which are largely
independent of one another. This mainstream view is often associated with the natural rate
or NAIRU hypothesis. According to the hysteresis approach, the labor market equilibrium
gets stuck at wherever it happens to be currently. Thus current unemployment is the best
predictor of its future values, since it has a unit root. In this context, it is impossible to
distinguish between structural and cyclical components, since each cyclical variation has
long-term eﬀects.
Both approaches have had a rather uneasy relationship to the empirical facts. EU unem-
ployment has drifted upwards in a series of big jumps coinciding largely with past recessions
(those of the mid-1970s, the early 1980s, the early 1990s, and the early 2000s). While un-
employment increased promptly with each recession, it has had a well-known tendency to
remain high for considerable periods aftert h es l u m pi np r o d u c td e m a n de n d e d . T h i sb e -
havior is diﬃcult to explain within an analytical framework where structural and cyclical
unemployment are largely independent of one another. At the other extreme, hysteresis
combined with random shocks to unemployment implies that unemployment hits 0 or 100
percent with probability one in ﬁnite time - clearly a counterfactual implication.
This paper pursues a diﬀerent approach, that of the chain reaction theory of labor mar-
ket activity.1 Here movements in unemployment are viewed as the cumulative outcome of
prolonged adjustments to a stream of labor market shocks. The shocks may be temporary
(such as oil price shocks) or permanent (such as changes in the level of productivity) or they
may have a variety of other dynamic features (e.g. AR or MA components); they may be
anticipated or unanticipated by the labor market participants. The prolonged adjustments
arise from adjustment costs, such as costs of hiring and ﬁring, search costs, training costs,
or costs of entering into and exiting from the labor force. Since the adjustments can be very
prolonged - much longer than the standard business cycle variations - it is not appropriate
to divide movements in unemployment into cyclical and structural components. But since
the adjustments are not inﬁnitely long, hysteresis is not present.
It would be profoundly misleading to dismiss the chain reaction theory as merely an
intermediate position between the structural and hysteresis approaches. In particular, the
focus of the chain reaction theory (CRT) is diﬀerent from either in the following respects:
• The CRT examines the temporal interactions among diﬀerent labor market adjustment
1See, for example, Henry and Snower (1996), Henry, Karanassou and Snower (2000), Karanassou and
Snower (1998, 2000).
2processes. For example, it investigates whether prolonged adjustments in employment,
wage setting, and labor force participation are complementary with one another in
propagating temporary and permanent labor market shocks beyond the time spanned
by business cycles. Such issues are not central to the structural approach, since it pre-
sumes that lagged adjustments die out after a few years. Nor does it play a signiﬁcant
role in the hysteresis approach, since unemployment is there assumed to have a unit
root regardless of what the underlying adjustment processes might be.2
• The CRT examines the interplay between the dynamic structure of the shocks and the
characteristics of the adjustment processes. For example, it explores whether changes
in adjustment processes that make the after-eﬀects of temporary shocks more persistent
also impart more inertia to the after-eﬀects of permanent shocks. These matters lie
outside the purview of the structural approach, which focuses primarily on the business
cycle ﬂuctuations generated by temporary shocks. The hysteresis approach also focuses
on temporary shocks, but now they are taken to have permanent eﬀects. (Permanent
shocks would lead to explosive labor market behavior under hysteresis.)
• The CRT focuses on the interaction between economic growth and adjustment processes.
In the presence of economic growth in the labor market - e.g. growth of productiv-
i t yl e a d i n gt oas t e a d yr i s ei nl a b o rd e m a n da n dg r o w t hi np o p u l a t i o nl e a d i n gt oa
steady rise in labor supply - the lagged adjustment processes never have a chance to
work themselves out entirely. Under these circumstances, the equilibrium levels of un-
employment are not the same as the frictionless equilibrium levels of unemployment.
Rather, they depend on how far these levels remain behind their moving (frictionless)
targets on account of the lagged adjustment processes.
This paper uses the CRT to explain EU unemployment in the following way. We begin by
depicting EU labor markets through a system of equations, including a labor demand, wage
setting, labor supply, production function, and unemployment equation. We estimate this
system for a macro dynamic panel of EU countries. The panel of countries, together with
cross-country restrictions on the adjustment processes, provide enough data points to enable
us to distinguish between the unemployment eﬀects of changes in our exogenous variables
and those of the dynamic adjustments to these changes.
Then we use the estimated system to decompose the movements of EU unemployment
into the dynamic responses to diﬀerent labor market shocks. The shocks are changes in
2Since the structural and hysteresis approaches downplay the temporal interactions among diﬀerent ad-
justment processes, labor market behavior is usually analyzed in terms of single-equation models (e.g. an
unemployment equation). By contrast, the CRT analyzes it in terms of multi-equation models - comprising
labor demand, labor supply, and wage setting behavior - in order to depict distinct adjustment processes
that interact with one another.
3the exogenous variables of our system. These exogenous variables are divided into three
groups: institutional variables, price variables a n dw h a tw ec a l lgrowth drivers (viz., factors
responsible for long-term economic growth).
Formally, let us begin with a few deﬁnitions:
Deﬁnition A shock at period t is the change in an exogenous variable xi from some ﬁxed
point in time τ (base period) to period t: sit = xit − xiτ,w h e r et ≥ τ.
Thus, the deviation through time of each exogenous variable from its base period level
is identiﬁed with a time series of one-oﬀ shocks: sit = xit − xiτ,s i,t+1 = xi,t+1 − xiτ,s i,t+2 =
xi,t+2 − xiτ, ....





is the change in the
u n e m p l o y m e n tr a t ea tp e r i o dt + j resulting from the period t shock sit.




t+2 (sit),. . .These unemployment responses may be derived by simulating our
estimated system, deriving the responses of all endogenous variables, and then using the
movements in these endogenous variables to derive the associated movements in unemploy-
ment.
Deﬁnition The dynamic contribution of the exogenous variable xi to unemployment rep-
resents the response of unemployment at each point in time to all past and contempo-
raneous shocks associated with the exogenous variable xi.
Since each shock sit in term period t generates a stream of unemployment responses,
uR
t+j (sit) for j ≥ 0, the time series of shocks for each exogenous variable xi (sit,s i,t+1,s i,t+2,...)










t+2 (si,t+2),. . .The
time series uDC
t+j (xi),j≥ 0, constitutes the dynamic contributions of the exogenous variable
xi to unemployment.
The aim of this paper is to reassess the driving forces underlying the swings in EU un-
employment over the past three decades through an analysis involving the following steps:
(i) identify salient groups of shocks, viz., institutional variables, price variables, and “growth
drivers” (sources of economic growth), (ii) estimate a labor market system for the EU coun-
tries, (iii) use this system to generate the unemployment responses to the above shocks,
and (iv) calculate the dynamic contribution of each exogenous variable to unemployment,
thereby shedding new light on the evolution of EU unemployment.
The empirical assessment of how a particular set of exogenous variables inﬂuences EU
unemployment depends signiﬁcantly on the intertemporal propagation channels we take into
4consideration. The estimated inﬂuence of our exogenous variables in the context above will
t u r no u tt ob eq u i t ed i ﬀe r e n tf r o mt h a ti nt h em o r es t a n d a rd empirical setup, where these
variables are depicted as inﬂuencing unemployment directly within a single unemployment
equation. The resulting empirical assessment will show that the inﬂuence of shocks depends
importantly on the temporal progation channels (consisting of the interrelated labor market
adjustment processes).
We ﬁnd the growth drivers play a much more important role in accounting for the main
swings in EU unemployment than the institutional or price variables. In the context of our
dynamic model, the movements in EU unemployment may be understood in terms of the
after-eﬀects from temporary and permanent shocks to our exogenous variables. The after-
eﬀects of temporary shocks measure the degree of “unemployment persistence,” whereas the
after-eﬀects of permanent shocks measure the degree of “unemployment responsiveness.”
Since diﬀerent exogenous variables enter diﬀerent labor market equations with diﬀerent dy-
namic characteristics, temporary shocks to diﬀerent exogenous variables are associated with
diﬀerent degrees of unemployment persistence, and permanent shocks to diﬀerent exoge-
nous variables generate diﬀerent degrees of unemployment responsiveness. These dynamic
features help explain the movements of EU unemployment.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the structure of our model. Section
3 presents our empirical model for the EU. Section 4 presents the resulting analysis of the
driving forces underlying the major movements in EU unemployment. Section 5 contrasts
our results with those generated by a single-equation analysis of EU unemployment. Section
6 presents empirical impulse response functions. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2. Structure of the Model
We estimate a structural vector autoregressive distributed lag model for the EU countries:3
A(L)yt = B(L)xt + εt,t =1 ,2,...,T, (2.1)
where L is the lag operator, yt is a vector of endogenous variables, xt is a vector of exoge-
nous variables (including deterministic trends), εt is a vector of identically independently
distributed error terms, A and B are coeﬃcient matrices, and
A(L)=A0 − A1L − ... − ApL
p, B(L)=B0 + B1L + ... + BqL
q.
3The dynamic system (2.1) is stable if, for given values of the exogenous variables, all the roots of the
determinantal equation
|A0 − A1L − ... − ApLp| =0
lie outside the unit circle. Note that the estimated equations in Section 3 below satisfy this condition.
5The endogenous variables of our system are employment (nt), the labor force (lt), the
real wage (wt), output (qt),a n dt h eu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t e(ut). All variables are national
aggregates and all (except the unemployment rate) are in logarithms. The equation system
(2.1) consists of ﬁve equations:
• a labor demand equation, describing the equilibrium employment,
• a labor supply equation, describing the equilibrium size of the labor force,
• a wage setting equation, describing real wage determination,
• a production function, and
• ad e ﬁnition of the unemployment rate (not in logs):4
ut = lt − nt. (2.2)
Substituting the estimated equations (2.1) into (2.2), and further algebraic manipulation,









jxt−j,t =1 ,2,...,T, (2.3)
where the autoregressive parameters φ and the vectors θ of the coeﬃcients of the exogenous
variables are functions of the estimated structural parameters of (2.1).
For expositional simplicity in explaining our decomposition of EU unemployment into
dynamic contributions of exogenous variables, consider a simple model where the unemploy-
ment equation (2.3) is of ﬁrst order and the vector xt consists of the contemporaneous values
of two exogenous variables, x1t and x2t:
ut = φ1ut−1 + θ1x1t + θ2x2t. (2.4)














1x2,t−j,t =1 ,2,...,T. (2.5)
4Given then the labor force and employment are in logarithms, this is an approximation.
5The stability of each of the equations in the dynamic system (2.1) does not necessarily imply the stability
of the reduced form unemployment rate equation (2.2). For the stability of the latter we need all the roots
of the polynomial
1 − φ1L − ... − φILI =0
to lie outside the unit circle. Note that our estimations in Section 3 below satisfy this condition.






exogenous variables constant at their initial period (t =1 ) levels throughout our span of
















We then subtract the base run values (2.6) from the unemployment rate equation (2.5)
to identify the dynamic contributions of the exogenous variables in the sample period:
u
DC












1 (x2,t−j − x21). (2.7)









1 (x1,t−j − x11), (2.8)








1 (x2,t−j − x21). (2.9)
Equations (2.8)-(2.9) measure the eﬀect of each exogenous variable on the unemployment
trajectory relative to the base run.6









i.e., the dynamic contributions of the exogenous variables and the base run unemployment
rate.
N e x t ,w ed e r i v ef u r t h e ri n ﬂuences of the exogenous variables on unemployment:
• The direct eﬀect of an exogenous variable on unemployment is the contemporaneous
eﬀect, occurring before the lagged adjustments take place. Speciﬁcally, the direct
eﬀects of the exogenous variables x1 and x2 on unemployment are the initial dynamic
contributions of these variables given by the ﬁrst terms on the right side of equations
6It is important to note that this is simply a dynamic accounting exercise, answering the question: how
much of the movement in unemployment can be accounted for by the movements in each of the exogenous
variables. It does not tell us what would happen to unemployment if the exogenous variables followed diﬀerent
trajectories, because in that event agents may change their behavior patterns and thus the parameters of
our behavioral equations may change (in accordance with the Lucas critique).
7(2.8) and (2.9), respectively:
u
DE
t (x1)=θ1 (x1t − x11) and u
DE
t (x2)=θ2 (x2t − x21). (2.11)
• The frictionless contribution of an exogenous variable to unemployment measures
how this variable would inﬂuence unemployment if all temporal adjustment processes
worked themselves out within each period of analysis. Speciﬁcally, the frictionless con-
tribution of each exogenous variable is obtained by computing the steady state7 of the
unemployment equation (2.4), ut = θ1x1t+θ2x2t
1−φ1 , and subtracting from it the steady state












(x2t − x21). (2.12)
Clearly, when the autoregressive order of the reduced form unemployment equation
is one, as assumed in the above illustration, the frictionless contributions series of
each exogenous variable represents a rescaling of its direct eﬀects. However, the two
measures will not be rescaled versions of one another in the more plausible case where
the multi-equation model (2.1) reduces to an unemployment equation of autoregressive
order greater than one.8
We now proceed to estimate the above inﬂuences and thereby glean new insights into
what drives the movements in EU unemployment.
7The steady state of a diﬀerence equation is derived by setting the lagged value of the endogenous variable
equal to its current value.
8To demonstrate this result, consider the following two-equation model:
nt = α1nt−1 + β1xt,l t = α2lt−1 + β2xt.
We can use the lag operator L to rewrite the above model as:
(1 − α1L)nt = β1xt, (1 − α2L)lt = β2xt.
Next, we multiply both sides of the above labor demand and supply equations by (1 − α2L) and (1 − α1L),
respectively, to obtain:
(1 − α1L)(1− α2L)nt = β1 (1 − α2L)xt,
(1 − α1L)(1− α2L)lt = β2 (1 − α1L)xt.
Recall that unemployment is deﬁned as ut = lt − nt. Thus the dynamic reduced form unemployment rate
equation is simply given by
(1 − α1L)(1− α2L)ut = β2 (1 − α1L)xt − β1 (1 − α2L)xt.
Observe that (i) the contemporaneous eﬀect of the exogenous variable xt on the unemployment rate is





1−α1. Along the lines of the above exposition, it is now easy to see that the direct
83. The Empirical Model
We have estimated a structural dynamic homogeneous panel data model comprising four
equations plus the deﬁnition of the unemployment rate.9 Our empirical model includes eleven
out of the ﬁfteen EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, Italy,
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom). (The other four - Greece, Ireland,
Luxembourg and Portugal - had to be excluded on account of data limitations.) The model
is estimated on annual OECD data for the period 1970-1999. Table 1 provides the deﬁnitions
of the endogenous and exogenous variables.
Table 1: Deﬁnitions of variables.
bt : r e a lS o c i a lS e c u r i t yb e n e ﬁts per person




kt : real capital stock
lt :l a b o r f o r c e
nt :t o t a l e m p l o y m e n t
ot : real oil prices
qt :r e a l G D P
rt : long-term real interest rates (%)
t :t i m e t r e n d
ut :u n e m p l o y m e n t r a t e d e ﬁned as ut = lt − nt
wt : real compensation per person employed
τt :i n d i r e c t t a x e s ( a s a % o f G D P )
θt :p r o d u c t i v i t y d e ﬁned as qt − nt
zt : working-age population
Note: All variables in logs except otherwise speciﬁed.
Source: OECD.
In estimating the model, we pool the observations across these countries, capturing cross-
country diﬀerences only through ﬁxed eﬀects (i.e. diﬀering constants in the estimated equa-
tions). Pooling has the advantage of increasing the eﬃciency of the econometric estimates
eﬀects of the exogenous variable x are given by
uDE
t (x)=β2 (xt − x1) − β1 (xt − x1)
=( β2 − β1)(xt − x1),


















The above shows that, in a multi-equation system, unless we impose the implausible assumption of identical
autoregressive coeﬃcients, the frictionless contributions are not equivalent to a rescaling of the direct eﬀects
of the exogenous variables.
9A broader description of the methodology underlying dynamic panel data estimation is provided in
Karanassou, Sala and Snower (2003). Here we outline only the main features of our estimation procedure.
9and thus provides a closer understanding of the adjustment mechanisms in dynamic re-
lationships (see Hsiao (1986) and Baltagi (1995)).10 Our ﬁxed-eﬀect model is empirically
preferred to heterogenous models containing individual country estimations, as indicated
below. Furthermore, Baltagi and Griﬃn (1997) compare a large number of panel data esti-
mators and ﬁnd that standard homogenous estimators perform better; they argue that “the
eﬃciency gains from pooling appear to more than oﬀset the biases due to intercountry het-
erogeneities” and “the gains from correcting for possible endogeneity in the lagged dependent
variable are disappointing...”.11 Finally, we can justify our choice of the ﬁxed eﬀects (least
squares dummy variables) estimator for each equation in our system by the very good ﬁto f
the estimated model (see Figure 1 below).
One of the challenges of estimating dynamic panel data models is a correct speciﬁcation
of the long-run relationships between the variables. In order to check if it is appropriate to
use stationary panel data estimation techniques, we conduct a series of unit root tests.
The use of pooled data can generate more powerful unit root tests than the popular
Dickey-Fuller (DF), Augmented DF and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests. In our empirical analysis,
to test for panel unit roots we have used the statistic proposed by Maddala and Wu (1999),






where πi i st h ep r o b a b i l i t yv a l u eo ft h eA D Fu n i tr o o tt e s tf o rt h eith unit (country). The
results of this test, displayed in table 2, indicate that we can indeed proceed with stationary
panel data estimation techniques.
Table 2: Panel Unit Root Tests.
λ(nit)= 3 6 .10
λ(qit)= 4 2 .88
λ(kit)= 4 1 .19








Notes: λ(·) is the test proposed by Maddala and Wu (1999).
The test follows a chi-square (22) distribution.
The 5% critical value is approximately 34.
To decide whether it is appropriate to use pooled equations, we select between each
of the pooled equations and the corresponding individual regressions by using the Schwarz
Information Criterion (SIC) as suggested by Smith (2000). We compute the model selection
10Banerjee (1999), Baltagi and Kao (2000) and Smith (2000) provide an overview of dynamic panel data
estimation techniques and nonstationary panel time series models.
11The cross-section and time dimensions in the Baltagi and Griﬃn (1997) study are very similar to the
dimensions of the panel data used in this paper.
10criteria as follows:




MLLi − N [0.5ki log(T)], (3.3)
where MLLpooled,M L L i denote the maximum log likelihoods of the pooled model and the
ith country time series regression, respectively; kpooled is the number of parameters estimated
in the ﬁxed eﬀects model (i.e. number of explanatory variables plus the 11 country speciﬁc
eﬀects), and ki is the number of parameters estimated in the individual country time series
regression (i.e. number of explanatory variables plus an intercept); N and T denote the
number of countries and estimation period, respectively. The model that maximizes the
SIC is preferred. As table 3 shows, the results indicate that the ﬁxed eﬀects model is
preferred for all our four behavioral equations:
Table 3: Homogenous vs. Heterogenous Panels.
SICpooled SICindividual
Labor Demand: 1051.25 > 1032.12
Wage Setting: 851.83 > 810.05
Labor Force: 1096.94 > 1089.98
Production Function: 972.48 > 862.59
Notes: The statistics were computed using (3.2) and (3.3).
The model that maximizes the selection criterion is preferred.
Thus, we estimate a stationary dynamic panel, which is homogeneous and yields consis-
tent ﬁxed eﬀects estimators for the 11 EU countries considered.12
Table 4 presents the estimated equations. As we can see, the labor demand depends
negatively on the real wage and the real interest rate, and positively on the level and the
growth rate of capital stock; it also depends positively on competitiveness, which is deﬁned as
the ratio of the import price to the GDP deﬂator, and on a linear trend. Real wages depend
negatively on the unemployment rate and the indirect tax rate (as a ratio to GDP), and
positively on productivity, social security beneﬁts and oil prices. The labor force depends
negatively on the level and growth of the unemployment rate and wages, whereas working-
age population has a positive sign.13 The production function is standard, with a positive
relationship of output with respect to employment, capital stock and a time trend (to capture
technological progress).
12The lag structure of the model was chosen on the basis of the Akaike and Schwarz model selection
criteria.
13The restriction of a long-run unit elasticity cannot be rejected by a Wald test at conventional signiﬁcance
levels. For this reason, although we report the unrestricted estimates in Table 4, we use the restricted labor
supply equation in the simulations of the following sections.
11Figure 1 indicates that the model tracks the actual unemployment rate remarkably well,
despite the cross-country restrictions on the coeﬃcients of the right-hand side variables.
Table 4: The EU model . 1970-1999.
Dependent variable: nt
Coeﬃcient St. e. Prob.
nt−1 1.42 0.039 0.000
nt−2 −0.48 0.035 0.000
wt −0.03 0.012 0.011
kt 0.02 0.009 0.035
∆kt 1.99 0.070 0.000
∆kt−1 −1.65 0.093 0.000
ct 0.02 0.006 0.003
rt −0.001 0.000 0.019




Coeﬃcient St. e. Prob.
wt−1 0.97 0.051 0.000
wt−2 −0.14 0.045 0.002
ut −0.29 0.045 0.000
θt 0.50 0.056 0.000
θt−1 −0.36 0.052 0.000
bt 0.14 0.020 0.000
bt−1 −0.12 0.022 0.000
ot 0.005 0.002 0.020
τt −0.59 0.180 0.001




Coeﬃcient St. e. Prob.
lt−1 1.00 0.031 0.000
lt−2 −0.08 0.026 0.005
ut −0.04 0.019 0.060
∆ut −0.21 0.037 0.000
wt −0.06 0.025 0.019
wt−1 0.05 0.025 0.039
zt 1.11 0.037 0.000




Coeﬃcient St. e. Prob.
qt−2 −0.25 0.025 0.000
kt 0.02 0.013 0.095
nt 0.09 0.019 0.000
ot −0.004 0.002 0.047
t 0.004 0.001 0.000
R2 0.999
MLL 1019.1










































































































































Figure 1: Actual and fitted values of the EU unemployment rates.
134. Revisiting the Causes of European Unemployment
On the basis of the empirical model above, we now examine the driving forces underlying
EU unemployment by deriving the dynamic contributions of our exogenous variables. We
divide these exogenous variables into three groups:
1. institutional variables: social security beneﬁts and indirect taxes,
2. prices: competitiveness, interest rates and oil prices; and
3. growth drivers: capital stock, technological change and working-age population
Figures 2 to 4 depict the direct eﬀects of each exogenous variable (or group of exogenous
variables), as well as their dynamic and frictionless unemployment contributions.
On account of the lagged adjustment processes in our model, the direct unemployment
eﬀects (uDE
t (xi)) of each exogenous variable (xit) give rise to smooth unemployment dynamic
contributions (uDC
t (xi)) in contrast with the frictionless contributions (uFC
t (xi)).
4.1. Contributions of the Institutional Variables
The left-hand panels of Figures 2 compare the direct eﬀects with the dynamic contributions
of the institutional variables, whereas the right-hand panels compare the direct eﬀects with
the frictionless contributions of these variables. Figures 2a and 2b describe the inﬂuence of
both institutional variables together, whereas the remaining ﬁgures deal with social security
contributions and indirect taxes separately.
Figure 2c shows that social security beneﬁts have pushed up the EU unemployment
rate by larger and larger amounts, amounting to an increase of 3.4 percentage points over
our sample period. They have had a progressively increasing negative inﬂuence on EU
employment, and a smaller negative inﬂuence on the EU labor force (via their inﬂuence on
wages and unemployment).
A comparison of Figures 2c and 2d highlights the role of lagged adjustment processes in
modifying the inﬂuence of social security beneﬁts through time. In Figure 2c we see that
social security beneﬁts had a pronounced positive direct eﬀect on unemployment in the ﬁrst
half of the 1970s, which stabilized over much of the sample period thereafter; however, the
unemployment contributions of social security beneﬁts, as noted, rise steadily over the entire
sample period.
Figure 2e indicates that the contribution of indirect taxes to unemployment rate have
been close to nill. Observe that in our model indirect taxes aﬀect employment and the labor
force only via their positive inﬂuence on the real wage. Most countries in our panel did not
experience signiﬁcant variations in indirect taxes (as a ratio of GDP); the only exceptions
14were France and Spain, which encountered changes in opposite directions, thus roughly































































































Figure 2. Institutional variables.





154.2. Contributions of Prices
F i g u r e s3d e s c r i b et h ei n ﬂuences of the price variables.
Figure 3c pictures the role of competitiveness (given the real oil price which is a separate
exogenous variable). In our model, a rise in competitiveness (deﬁned as the ratio of import
prices to the GDP deﬂator) raises employment, presumably through import substitution.
This, in turn, aﬀects the real wage, which inﬂuences both employment and the labor force.
The ﬁgure shows that the rise in EU competitiveness reduced unemployment through the
second half of the 1970s and 1980s, and the fall in EU competitiveness (possibly linked to the
EU’s disappointing productivity performance and rate of capital accumumlation) stimulated
unemployment signiﬁcantly in the 1990s.
Figure 3e shows the role of the long-term real interest rate (given the capital stock, which
is a separate exogenous variable). Similarly to competitiveness, the inﬂuence of the real in-
terest rate on unemployment operates primarily through employment (rather than the labor
force). From 1970 to 1983, interest rate movements have reduced unemployment (reach-
ing a maximum of a 1 percentage point reduction in 1978 and 1979), but with the general
shift towards tigher monetary policy, they stimulated unemployment thereafter (reaching a
maximum of nearly 2 percentage points in 1996).
A comparison of Figures 3e and 3f suggests that movements in the real interest rate aﬀect
unemployment with signiﬁcant lags. The direct unemployment eﬀects of the real interest rate
reached a trough in 1975, and fell to zero by 1980; but the associated dynamic contributions
reached a trough only in 1978, and fell to zero by 1984. The direct unemployment eﬀects
were positive and roughly stable throughout the 1980s and ﬁr s th a l fo ft h e1 9 9 0 s ;b u tt h e
associated dynamic unemployment contributions rose gradually from 1984 to 1996.
Finally, Figure 3g shows a small inﬂuence of the oil price on unemployment, contrary
to many other studies. In part, the small magnitude may be due to the fact that the
inﬂuence is assessed for a given capital stock and competitiveness (which are other exogenous
variables). The oil price shocks of the mid-1970s and early 1980s undoubtedly reduced capital
formation and aﬀected competitiveness. In part, some of what we estimate to be the delayed
unemployment contributions of movements in competitiveness and the capital stock are








































































































































Figure 3. Price variables.




































































































































Figure 4. Growth drivers.






4.3. Contributions of the Growth Drivers
Figures 4c and 4g suggest that two of our growth drivers - the capital stock and working
age population - play a dominant role in accounting for movements in EU unemployment,
with the capital stock being the more important. The ﬁgures show the unemployment con-
18tributions to be very large, but one must keep in mind that it is quite unrealistic to imagine
that the capital stock would grow as it did if the working-age population were constant
(implicitly assumed in Figure 4c, since the unemployment contributions are assessed for a
given population). Thus it is more informative to examine the unemployment contributions
from its combined inﬂuence, as shown in Figure 4a.
The powerful inﬂuence of the capital stock and working-age population on EU unem-
ployment is underscored Figure 5, which shows the dynamic unemployment contributions
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Figure 5. Dynamic contributions under different growing scenarios
5. Single- versus Multi-equation Models
Most empirical studies on the causes of unemployment are conducted in terms of single,
aggregate unemployment equations. These equations are interpretted as reduced forms that
are meant to summarize the behavior of multi-equation labor market systems, such as the
one presented above. The open question is whether single-equation models are a good proxy
for their multi-equation counterparts in a dynamic context. Karanassou, Sala, and Snower
(2003) have shown that when the individual equations in a multi-equation system do not have
the same regressors, the multi-equation models cannot be aggregated into single-equation
models. How important is this limitation in explaining EU unemployment?
Naturally, single- and multi-equation models of unemployment both have their strengths
and weaknesses. Theoretically, the single-equation models are simply aggregated summaries
of the multi-equation counterparts. Empirically, multi-equation models require more data to
be estimated and thus are associated with lower degrees of freedom. In this paper, we have
sought to overcome this diﬃculty by pooling country data across the EU. Thus our model
may be a useful tool in exploring whether single-equation models deliver biased summaries of
19their multi-equation underpinnings. Addressing this question can shed light on whether the
diﬀerence between our analysis of EU unemployment and those in the conventional literature
(e.g. Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991), Phelps (1994), Phelps and Zoega (1998)) may be
due single- versus multi-equation modeling.
Table 5 presents a version of a single-equation model where four out of the seven exoge-
nous variables present in the multi-equation system are considered. (The other exogenous
variables were statistically insigniﬁcant.) Even though the interest rate is marginally signif-
icant, it is retained to provide a better speciﬁcation of the model.14
Table 5: Single-equation model.
Dependent variable: ut
Coeﬃcient St. e. Prob.
ut−1 1.23 0.05 0.00
ut−2 −0.51 0.04 0.00
kt −0.014 0.01 0.02
∆kt −0.37 0.06 0.00
rt 0.024 0.019 0.21
bt 0.02 0.01 0.00
zt 0.18 0.04 0.00
zt−1 −0.13 0.04 0.00
R2 0.979
MLL 1081.1
Figure 6a describes the diﬀerences in the unemployment contributions derived from the
single- and the multi-equation analysis. Observe that social security beneﬁts - commonly
considered one of the main sources of EU unemployment in the mainstream literature (e.g.
Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) - have a much greater
inﬂuence on unemployment in the single-equation model than in the multi-equation system.
Interest rates have also been assigned a major role in explaining the rise of EU unemploy-
ment over the 1980s and ﬁrst part of the 1990s (e.g. Phelps (1994) and Phelps and Zoega
(1998 and 2001)). Figure 6b shows our multi-equation model assigns a more important role
to the interest rates than the corresponding single-equation model does. It is worth recalling,
however, that our multi-equation model aims to capture only that part of the inﬂuence of
interest rates that operates independently of the capital stock, the working-age population,
14This speciﬁcation allows a comparison with at least one variable belonging to each of the groups we
have already distinguished: social security beneﬁts, in the institutional variables group; interest rates, in the
prices group; and, both, capital formation and working-age population as growth drivers.
The signiﬁcance of interest rates at the 21% size of the test (large with respect to the standard 5%
or 10%) aﬀects only marginally the magnitude of the coeﬃcient. Thus, the central conclusions from our
decomposition analysis would remain substantially intact at a lower size of the test.
20and our other exogenous variables. In the single-equation models, on the other hand, the
capital stock and working-age population usually do not appear, since the latter are trended
variables whereas unemployment is untrended.
Figures 6c and 6d show that when the capital stock and working-age population are
included as explanatory variables in the single-equation model, the capital stock plays a much
smaller role for EU unemployment than in our multi-equation model, whereas population
plays a much larger role.
In short, our analysis suggests that single-equation models may indeed provide a biased
account of EU unemployment, inﬂating the role of institutional variables and underplaying
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Figure 6: Dynamic contributions of different exogenous variables:
Multi-equation versus single-equation results
216. Eﬀects of Temporary and Permanent Shocks
In this section we construct aggregative measures of the dynamic unemployment responses
to temporary and permanent shocks.15 Speciﬁcally, we consider two such inﬂuences:
• (i) the persistent unemployment eﬀects of temporary shocks, called unemployment
persistence, and
• (ii) the delayed unemployment eﬀects of permanent shocks, called unemployment re-
sponsiveness.
A temporary shock (TS) is identiﬁed as a one-oﬀ unit increase in an exogenous variable
at time t, assuming that all other exogenous variables remain unchanged. Due to the labor
market adjustment processes, the shock aﬀects unemployment in periods subsequent to the
shock; and in a dynamically stable system, the unemployment eﬀects will of course die out
with the passage of time. We denote the responses of unemployment to the above impulse
by u
R(TS)
t+j ,j≥ 0, where R(TS) stands for “response (R) to a temporary shock (TS).
This unemployment response is given by the diﬀerence between the unemployment rate in
the presence and absence of the shock. The term u
R(TS)
t is the immediate impact of the
s h o c k ,a n dt h ew h o l et i m es e r i e su
R(TS)
t+j ,j≥ 0, is the impulse response function (IRF) of
unemployment.16
Our measure of unemployment persistence, π, captures the degree to which unemployment







Note that the total eﬀect of the temporary shock is the sum of the immediate response
and the persistence measure: u
R(TS)
t + π. In the absence of lagged labor market adjustment
15For a detailed discussion of these measures see Karanassou and Snower (1998).
16Generally, the IRF is obtained by the inﬁnite moving average (IMA) representation of the model. Con-
sider, for example, a simple dynamic model for unemployment with one exogenous variable:
ut = αut−1 + βxt, |α| < 1.
The IMA representation of u with respect to x is given by
ut = βxt + αβxt−1 + α2βxt−2 + α3βxt−3 + ...
Assuming that in period t there is a one-oﬀ unit increase in x, the IRF of the unemployment rate is
simply given by the slope coeﬃcients of the above equation:
u
R(TS)
t = β, u
R(TS)
t+1 = αβ, u
R(TS)
t+2 = α2β, u
R(TS)
t+3 = α3β, ...
22processes, unemployment would not be aﬀected after the temporary shock has disappeared
and thus quantitative unemployment persistence π would be zero. At the opposite extreme
of hysteresis, the temporary shock would have a permanent eﬀect on unemployment and
thus π would be inﬁnite.
We derive persistence measures associated with each of the institutional and price vari-
ables17 by simulating the empirical model of Section 3. In each simulation, the one-oﬀ shock
(i.e. the change in an exogenous variable) is introduced in period t =1while all other
exogenous variables remain ﬁxed. In particular, the shock represents a one per cent increase
in an exogenous variable that is in logs (e.g. beneﬁts), and a one percentage point increase
in a variable that is a rate (e.g. interest rate). Note that (a) since our estimated model is
dynamically stable, the impulse response functions do not depend on the initial values of
the endogenous variables; (b) due to the linearity of the model, the IRF’s do not depend on
the value at which the other exogenous variables are held constant; and (c) if, instead of a
unit shock, we consider a shock of some arbitrary size (m) linearity of the model enables us
to compute its impact on unemployment as u
R(TS)
t × m (i.e. multiply the size of the shock
with the unemployment response to a unit shock).
Table 6 contains two types of persistence measures. Panel A gives the amount of per-
sistence in response to a unit shock in each of the exogenous variables, i.e. the sum of
the unemployment responses deﬂa t e db yt h es i z eo fe a c hs h o c k . ( F o re x a m p l e ,ao n e - o ﬀ
1% increase in competitiveness (ct) reduces unemployment contemporaneously by 0.015 per-
centage points and, on aggregate, decreases future unemployment by 0.17%.) This statistic
-“ normalized persistence” - is useful since it readily enables us to compute the persistence
associated with a shock of any size (for each exogenous variable): the actual degree of per-
sistence is simply the product of normalized persistence and the size of the shock.
Panels B and C present estimates of “average persistence” by considering shock sizes
that are in line with the historical variation of the exogenous variables. In Panel B, for
each exogenous variable, the shock size is computed as the standard deviation of the change
of the variable for each of the 11 countries in our sample and then taking their arithmetic
average.18 Then average persistence is calculated as the product of normalized persistence
(in Panel A) and the above shock size. Panel C reports “average persistence” when the size
of the shock is computed as the average of the absolute value of the change in the series.
Observe that in all cases competitiveness is associated with the highest degree of unem-
ployment persistence, while beneﬁts and interest rates are associated with little persistence.
17Except for the tax rate and oil price which, as shown in Figure 2, have a negligible impact on the
unemployment rate.
18Arithmetic averages of course can give only a rough indication of the average variation of the shock.
Alternatively, one could weight the shocks of diﬀerent countries by some measure of their contribution to
the EU unemployment rate. For brevity, however, we do not pursue these possibilities here.
23Table 6: Persistence of temporary shocks (%)
Panel A ct bt rt





t -0.015 -0.003 0.000
"future" eﬀect
π -0.170 0.037 0.005
Panel B ct bt rt
size of the shock




t -0.10 0.01 0.000
"future" eﬀect
π -1.08 0.17 0.006
Panel B ct bt rt
size of the shock




t -0.07 0.012 0.00
"future" eﬀect
π -0.74 0.13 0.005
Figure 7 plots the impulse response functions of unemployment to these temporary
shocks. Since the shock occurs in period t =1 ,t h eﬁgure depicts the changes in unem-
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The shock is a one-off 1% increase in the exogenous variable in period t=1.
Figure 7. Unemployment Effects of Temporary Shocks
Next we examine the unemployment eﬀects of a unit permanent shock (PS) that starts
in period t. Our measure of imperfect responsiveness, ρ, captures the degree to which unem-
ployment does not adjust fully to the new long-run equilibrium. In particular, it is speciﬁed
as the sum of the diﬀerences through time between (a) the disparity between actual and
long-run unemployment in the presence of the shock and (b) this disparity in the absence
o ft h es h o c k . T h i si se q u i v a l e n tt ot h ed i ﬀerences through time between (a) the disparity







where R(PS) stands for the “response (R)t oap e r m a n e n ts h o c k( PS), and (b) the dis-
19Since the size of the shock does not aﬀect the time path of the responses but only rescales them, the
plots in Figure 7 have been generated by a unit size shock.

















In the absence of lagged labour market adjustment processes, unemployment would be “per-
fectly responsive,” i.e. ρ would be zero. If however the full eﬀects of the permanent labour
demand shock emerge only gradually, so that the short-run unemployment eﬀects of the shock
are less than the long-run eﬀect, then unemployment will be “under-responsive:” ρ<0, i.e.
unemployment displays inertia. However if unemployment overshoots its long-run equilib-
rium, then our measure may be positive, making unemployment “over-responsive:” ρ>0.
Under hysteresis, ρ is inﬁnite.
The permanent shocks in our model are associated with the growth drivers, viz., the
capital stock (kt) and working age population (zt). Assuming that these variables grow
around a linear trend, we let the permanent shock be represented by a one-oﬀ change in
their period t growth rates (i.e., a parallel shift in the level of the variables). Panel A in
Table 7 gives the change in the long-run unemployment rate and our measure of imperfect
responsiveness for a percentage point decrease (increase) in the growth rate of capital stock
(working-age population). For example, a 1% permanent decrease in capital stock leads
to a 0.17% increase in the long-run unemployment rate and produces unemployment over-
responsiveness of 2.9%. We call this statistic “normalized responsiveness”. In our model,
the unemployment responds to a permanent shock in both capital stock and population by
overshooting, as shown in Figure 8.









M o r e o v e r ,e a c hp e r m a n e n ts h o c k sm a yb ev i e w e da sa ni n ﬁnite sequence of temporary shocks. Thus, the
unemployment response in period t + j, j ≥ 0, to the unit permanent shock may be expressed by the sum




























































Similarly to our persistence measures, diﬀerent sizes of the permanent shock lead to a
rescaling of the normalized measures given in Panels B and C of Table 7. One plausible
measure of the size of the permanent shock of a growth driver series is obtained by the
standard deviation of the change of the series: 1.30 for capital stock and 0.68 for population.21
Then “average responsiveness” (in Panel B of Table 7) may be computed as the product
of normalized responsiveness and the size of the shock. When capital stock is permanently
reduced by 1.3%, unemployment overshoots by 3.77 percentage points before it stabilizes
to its new long-run value of 0.22 %. On the other hand, a 0.68% increase in population
generates 3.1% of unemployment overshooting until unemployment stabilizes at 0.29%.
An alternative way to measure the size of the shock is by considering the average change
(in absolute terms) in the growth driver series: 3.39 for capital stock and 0.61 for popula-
tion.22 Panel C of Table 7 shows that a 3.39% (0.61%) permanent decrease (increase) in
capital stock (population) yields 9.83 (2.78) percentage points of unemployment overshoot-
ing through time. Note that the average responsiveness measures indicate that capital stock
is more over-responsive than population (Panels B-C, Table 7). However, when we normalize
by the size of the shock capital stock is less over-responsive than population (Panel A, Table
7).
21We measure the size of the shock as the standard deviation of the growth rate series, σk.( O f c o u r s e ,
the size of the shock reported in Table 7 is the arithmetic mean of the standard deviations of the individual
countries in our sample.) Under the assumption of normality, this means that there is a 35% chance that
the magnitude of the unexpected decrease or increase in the capital stock growth rate is between 0 and σk.
(Similarly, for population.)
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Figure 8: Effects of Permanent Shocks
The shock is a
1% permanent increase in working age population,
1% permanent decrease in capital stock.
7. Conclusions
This paper takes a fresh look at the sources of unemployment in the European Union. The
analysis focuses on prolonged adjustments to labor market shocks, in the form of changes in
institutional variables, price variables, and growth drivers (the capital stock and working-
age population). We derive the unemployment responses to these shocks and compute the
dynamic contributions of each shock to the movements in unemployment. In this context, it
emerges that the growth drivers play a particularly important role in accounting for the main
swings in EU unemployment. Regarding the institutional variables, social security beneﬁts
play a more important role than taxes; and regarding the price variables, competitiveness
plays a more important role than interest rates and oil prices.
We argue that our results diﬀer from those in the mainstream literature since we focus on
prolonged labor market adjustments in the context of a dynamic multi-equation system. We
have shown that single-equation models understate the importance of lagged adjustments.
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